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Abstract 
Intellectual Property (IP) is a key intangible asset influencing corporate performance and its 
management is increasingly recognized as a central element of corporate strategy. Analysts 
however, have largely focused on IP management within the firm, overlooking the different 
and pervasive problem of how to manage IP in the context of inter-firm collaborative 
projects. Here, groups of firms, often competitors, and sometimes their customer 
organizations, collaborate in the design, development, manufacture and maintenance of 
complex products. Such collaborations involve exchanges of large amounts of proprietary 
technical data, facilitated through the use of advanced IT tools. How can organizations 
exploit the capabilities offered by these tools without increasing the vulnerability of IP assets 
to misappropriation or leakage? In the UK defense market an extensive set of formal 
contractual tools are being developed to support IP management in collaborative projects. 
Through an in-depth study of IP management practice in UK defense projects we analyze the 
extent to which contractual tools can combine with technical solutions to provide answers to 
the problems posed by IP management in complex, long-term collaborative projects. We 
conclude that contractual and technical tools must be underpinned by managerial changes that 
bring together functions that remain separated in most large corporations: IT management, 
and legal and commercial departments. 
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Introduction 
Until recently, the management of Intellectual Property (IP) and its associated Rights (IPR) 
was treated as a specialized function within a company. Corporate strategy would concern 
itself mainly with the management of tangible and financial assets, and IP management 
would be left to specialist lawyers would deal with patents and other forms of IP protection as 
needed. Similarly, IT (Information Technology) managers who dealt with corporate systems 
for data access control rarely consulted with the legal or commercial departments on IP issues 
such as the potential data leakage inherent in the treatment and transfer of electronic data. 
This situation is changing. Toward the late 1990s, analysts were underlining the importance 
of IP and IPR management as a key element of corporate policy2. IP is now seen as a 
strategic intangible asset influencing corporate performance3.  
Important as IP is for the modern corporation, scholars have found it a difficult concept to 
define accurately.4 The American Heritage Dictionary defines IP as a product of the intellect 
that has commercial value. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as property which is the 
product of invention or creativity, and which does not exist in a tangible physical form. In 
short IP refers to intangibles that are commercially valuable. Yet, IP can be expressed in 
many different, tangible, forms: books, blueprints, designs, trademarks are all expressions of 
IP, which can be made available to other parties. The use of IT and electronic networks 
increases the risk of all these forms of IP to misappropriation or leakage, inadvertent or 
otherwise.  
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As the recognition of the commercial value of IP deepens, its protection becomes an 
increasingly important managerial challenge. Simultaneously, data replication and 
transmission is becoming easier thanks to rapid development in IT, thus augmenting the risk 
of data conveying valuable IP leaking to competitors. A US survey estimated that $53 and 
$59 billion were lost to 138 responding firms through incidents in which proprietary 
information was disclosed. Over two thirds of the firms surveyed “strongly agreed” with the 
statement “The Internet, networks, computers and related technologies have created 
significant new threats to sensitive proprietary information.” This potential threat emerged 
clearly as the most important source of concern, particularly among large companies . 
Similarly, a 2004 survey of 203 companies conducted by the UK National High Tech Crime 
Unit, reported that 12 per cent of the firms had experienced instances of data theft through the 
Internet, causing losses amounting to approximately £7 billion.5 Such realization of the risks 
posed by the growing use of electronic data networks suggests the need for specialized IP and 
information management strategies addressing data control and access issues.  
So far, corporate responses and academic analyses have focused on IP management within 
the firm.6 The problems and challenges faced are, however, likely to be different when 
managing IP in the context of inter-firm collaborative projects in which groups of firms, 
often competitors, and sometimes their customer organizations share in the design, 
development, manufacture and operation of complex products. In these cases large amounts 
of technical data (including designs, product specifications, manufacturing processes, etc.) 
can be shared through the use of advanced IT tools. The resulting “Shared Digital 
Environments” (SDEs) involve electronic networks, software platforms, and electronic data 
management systems used by project partners to manage and share technical data. SDEs are 
being proposed as a tool to assist large design, engineering and manufacturing projects in a 
wide variety of sectors, for reasons of efficiency and improved project management, among 
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others. The management of IP in SDEs poses problems that are different in nature and scope 
to those of IP management within the firm.  
This article analyzes the nature of the problems posed by IP management in SDEs and 
discusses a range of approaches to their solution. It is based on an in-depth analysis of their 
use in the UK defense industries. In this area an exceptional effort is taking place to develop 
precise codes of practice and procedures affecting all aspects of the contractual process and 
project management including IP management. In collaboration with industry, the UK 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) has developed extensive guidelines and sets of contractual 
conditions on the management of IP in SDEs. This situation provides a unique test bed for 
analyzing the impact of formal regulations and processes on the management of IP, and the 
challenges faced when explicitly addressing IP management issues in inter-organizational 
networks and systems. Further, existing MOD procurement policies emphasize the use of 
inter-organizational IT networks to improve project performance. A context of detailed IP 
regulations is thus set against an effort to develop and implement large SDEs.  
The article is structured as follows. We first discuss our approach. We then introduce the 
main relevant traits of present UK defense procurement practice, in particular the way it deals 
with IP, and analyze the specific IP management problems encountered when conducting 
collaborative ventures in the defense industries. We follow with a discussion of the strategies 
to respond to these challenges, and an analysis of the ways in which two specific SDEs have 
been implemented. We find that they have adopted different implementation models. We 
conclude with lessons for IP management in collaborative ventures. 
Our approach 
Our analysis has followed a case study methodology addressing the IP corporate management 
practices in the main British defense-related corporations and the way they relate to the IP 
practices of their main customer: the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD). The first step in our 
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study was a documentary study of the IP practices and regulations used in defense contracting 
laid out in the “contractual conditions” used by the MOD procurement agency (the Defence 
Procurement Agency –DPA). We followed with a program of semi-structured interviews 
using two different interview protocols, one addressing corporate policies and activities, and 
another oriented to the analysis of IP management practices within specific projects. The 
main objective of the interview program was to determine the ways in which firms addressed 
IP management in a digital environment both within the corporation and in collaborative 
programs.  
To guide the interviews we designed a protocol structured according to a list of IP 
management topics with potential effects on firm and corporate performance. We based the 
list on IP management issues identified by the extant literature on IP management within 
specific sectors and firms.7 A panel of academic, industrial and government IPR experts 
validated the interview protocol, which we then piloted through a 6-hour long interview with 
two IPR and commercial managers of a major UK defense corporation. Following the pilot 
we adapted the protocol and used the two different formats, as noted above.  
We then carried out interviews with all major UK defense systems producers. Between 
November 2003 and July 2004 we conducted detailed interviews with 20 relevant executives; 
including IP Directors, Commercial executives, IT systems directors, program directors and 
head engineers. In addition we held several meetings with other officials from industry, the 
DPA and a defense industrial association. In total we carried out 66 hours of meetings and 
interviews with 33 senior officials and executives. Except for six telephone interviews, the 
rest were all face-to-face interviews and meetings carried out by the both of us. 
Within each participating company most of the interviewees were self-selected by their 
organizations based on their work on IP management and IPR issues both within the 
company and in collaborative projects and defense contracts. Because of the commercial 
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sensitivity of the issues explored we will not attribute the information collected and used in 
this article to any name and affiliation of the individuals interviewed.  
The case: Managing IP in the UK defense market 
All the firms and organizations involved in this study are simultaneously using different 
network technologies and inter-organizational systems8 in several projects. These are usually 
large complex projects involving a number of suppliers, coordinated through a prime 
contractor, to provide a system or a service for use by the UK armed forces. Under the 
current UK defense procurement approach, most of the above stakeholders participate in 
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) set up by the DPA.9 The IPTs bring together representatives 
from the client organization, final users and industrial producers, and play a complex 
interface role between suppliers, the MOD client and military users. From an MOD 
perspective the IPT is seen as its internal “supplier,” in charge of delivering a system to 
frontline users. From the industry perspective the IPT plays the role of customer. Each IPT 
has a “Leader” who is the line manager for most core members of the IPT, and the formal 
point of contact with the MOD representative (final customer), and is responsible for meeting 
the agreed cost and performance targets and milestones.  
In the British approach, IPTs are the key organizational mechanism for the management of 
defense procurement projects, and an avenue to facilitate constant communication among all 
main project stakeholders throughout the project’s life cycle, from conception, through 
research and development, production, operation, maintenance and upgrading and, ultimately 
disposal. In practice, every project establishes its own set of network technologies and inter-
organizational systems, and its contractual conditions and procedures. The responsibility rests 
on the IPT and ultimately on its Leader: different projects will adopt different contractual 
clauses, different IT systems and different approaches to the management of IP. This means 
high set up costs for every project (there is an element of reinventing the wheel and limited 
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cross-project learning). Consequently, defense firms work with a wide variety of network 
environments and under varying contractual conditions. For instance, one of the firms 
interviewed is running 300 separate projects supported by different IT networking 
arrangements and contractual conditions to manage and share data with, often the same, 
customers and suppliers. Such a situation engenders not only additional costs but also a 
situation in which it is difficult to control and monitor the information flows through the 
variety of inter-organizational systems. 
That every project sets up its own IT system and IP rules and practices is also explained by 
the lack of detailed corporate IP policies. Companies are familiar with the process of 
protecting their IP: it is common for large firms, including those in this study, to employ 
patent attorneys, copyright specialists, etc. within an IP department. For instance, the firms 
interviewed for this project either focused their IP management approaches on patenting 
strategies or relied on trade secrets. Yet a concentration on formally protecting firm IP does 
not amount to a full-fledged corporate IP management policy. Rather, a comprehensive IP 
policy should also include, for instance, monitoring of enforcement of corporate IPR and 
importantly, establishing company-wide processes and procedures for the treatment and use 
of corporate IP, whether they be formally protected or not. Instead, we have observed that the 
IP management “ethos” is biased, in the main, toward the protection processes – deciding 
whether or not to patent. Yet, the often-informal practices that determine, for instance, when 
and how to share proprietary information with clients and partners are not instituted as part of 
a corporate IP policy.10 The rest of this section discusses some of the problems that the 
defense companies and their customers have encountered when addressing IP issues in this 
context.  
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IP issues in collaborative environments 
The protection of information within SDEs 
The first key problem with an SDE is the protection of “background information.” 
Background information refers to the wide range of pre-existing proprietary information that 
a company brings to a collaborative project, from technical data and components and 
subsystems, to manufacturing processes and design techniques. These will need to be 
integrated with technology brought by other firms or developed for this project, and therefore 
other firms may need to have access to such “background information.” By sharing 
background information through SDEs companies run the risk of inadvertent leakage of 
commercially sensitive information; not only technical data about specific components, but 
also designs, design techniques or other processes that are not usually patented, but rather 
kept secret.  
The second potential problem relates to the early release of “foreground information,” 
information developed during the course of the project. Although the MOD will have rights 
of use over such foreground information whenever it has funded its development, the concern 
for contractors relates to the possibility that, through an SDE, the customer may access data 
that is still being worked upon. First, work-in-progress foreground information may include 
commercially sensitive information on company techniques and processes that will not be 
present in the final data packs delivered to the customer. Second, firms are concerned about 
liability issues that may be derived from the customer accessing and using data that are still in 
draft form and not ready for delivery to the customer.  
SDEs generate concerns in relation to both of these problems. Because digital data is easy to 
replicate, systems to monitor and track the information shared through the SDE and strict 
procedures on data sharing must be established. The establishment of such systems and 
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procedures is more than a technical problem. Although approaches exist or have been 
suggested for strict data access control, there is a palpable fear among the staff responsible 
for IP policy in all the companies interviewed that engineers do not adequately appreciate the 
importance that misappropriation of “background information” may have for their firm. 
Anecdotes abound of engineers that were only too happy to share proprietary and 
commercially sensitive technical details with their peers in other companies. An example of 
this is an incident in which an engineer blithely shared the software architecture of the firm’s 
proprietary process with an engineer of a collaborating firm.11 Interviewees attributed such 
behavior to “cultural” traits within the engineering community that drive individuals to share 
their work with their partners across organizational divides, much in the same way that 
academics are widely known to do. Although most of the anecdotes belonged to instances in 
which such exchanges were not always facilitated by electronic networks (sometimes in 
conversations and data exchanges in paper form) concerns were expressed about what would 
happen when the digital systems for collaboration are in place that could allow a loquacious 
engineer to send reams of technical information across to project partners at the click of a 
button.  
All companies were concerned about this problem, albeit in different degrees, depending on 
the extent to which they saw their competitive advantage as depending upon codified 
technologies that could be transferred to potential competitors.12 They all agreed, however, 
that there is a need to “educate” their engineering staff about the importance of protecting 
their IP, particularly as inter-organizational collaboration is increasingly being supported by 
advanced IT. 
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Convergence of product and process data  
An effect of the use of IT in systems design is the confluence of product and process data 
within the same data sets. This is the case, for instance, in the manufacture of specialized 
components for aero-engines or for aero-structures, which is driven by unique software-based 
processes. Naturally companies do not wish to reveal these processes to third parties, but 
sharing product data in electronic format could imply sharing also software-based processes 
when product and processes data are inextricably linked. Companies that base their 
competitive advantage on the uniqueness of their manufacturing processes fear that an SDE 
could make them vulnerable to disclosure of their trade secrets. 
Divergent approaches to IP management and data control among collaborators 
To complicate matters even further, defense projects will often involve foreign partners 
operating within different legal and regulatory environments. This means, for instance, that 
an SDE will require data control access systems able to cope with the export and technology 
control regulations in each of the participating countries. As technical data, hence IP is 
covered under the export control regime of most NATO countries, sharing of IP invariably 
would come under export control considerations. Collaborating companies have to ensure 
that data mounted in an SDE does not violate each collaborating partner’s national export 
control regime. IP management methods will have to be coupled with the technical and 
regulatory structure emanating from the need to adhere to different export control regulations.  
Equally, coping with different approaches to IP management across countries is problematic. 
Firms may not be able to trust the practices of their foreign partners and may decide to 
withhold information. We were offered examples of firms involved in international 
collaborative research programs that were not contributing their best IP to the project, which 
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descended into a situation of generalized mistrust, sub-optimal performance of the project, 
and in some cases, product.13  
A related problem is the lack of consistency in the meaning of the terms used by firms and 
governments to class the different levels of information protection and access. For instance, 
terms like “restricted” are interpreted differently among firms. Although we found no cases in 
which these differences led to identifiable financial losses or leakage of vital IP, our 
interviewees were adamant about the need for consistency and common use of terms, 
particularly when structuring an SDE for collaborative projects.  
The responses 
The issues and difficulties presented above may not pose an insurmountable barrier to the 
introduction of SDEs in collaborative defense projects. In fact, both customers in the defense 
agencies and their industrial suppliers have been seeking solutions to address the 
aforementioned problems through four different but interrelated areas: 
1. the definition of codified procedures to enable the assured identification of all individuals 
accessing the system, together with their rights of use across all stakeholders; 
2. the establishment of procedures and rules regarding the management of the SDE, and the 
marking and segregation of the data the SDE contains; 
3. the network technologies and inter-organizational systems they support;  
4. the underlying training necessary to raise awareness of the importance of IP management 
among stakeholders and to explain the nature and implications of the tools and procedures 
in place. 
The first two areas or aspects, can, in principle, be addressed through contractual conditions 
and associated commitments.  
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Contractual conditions 
Buyers may try to address the uncertainty on the use and sharing of IP and IPRs that follows 
from the collaboration of diverse partners in the development and production of large 
complex systems through the inclusion of detailed contractual provisions. In the UK, a wide 
choice of DEFCONs (“Defence Conditions”) and DEFFORMS (templates for annexes that 
can be appended to contracts ) are available for contract officers to include in contracts.14 
These provide detailed contractual clauses and provisions applicable to a wide set of 
situations. Table 1 lists the most relevant DEFCONs dealing with IPR, including data access 
issues. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Although it is not mandatory for IPTs to include specific DEFCONs within a contract, or to 
follow to the letter the text within a specific DEFCON, explicit guidance documents 
recommend the adoption of some DEFCONs in specific contractual conditions. For instance, 
DEFCON 14 is commonly included in contracts and its use is recommended whenever the 
contracted work is likely to generate IP. This and other generally used DEFCONs provide, in 
practice, an established contractual framework that defines the MOD negotiation policy for 
key aspects of defense procurement, including IPR. Yet it is ultimately the responsibility of 
the specific contractual team to decide which DEFCONs to include and whether or not to 
modify them.  
While some DEFCONs are relatively straightforward and are applauded by the defense 
companies for their necessity, there are others that have given rise to serious contention 
between the MOD and defense suppliers. In part, the differences emerge from the difficulties 
to cover all possible future events through generic contractual provisions. For instance, many 
defense systems are used for long periods, extending over three or more decades during 
which they will be subjected to several planned and unplanned upgrades and changes, for 
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instance, the customer may require improvements in system capabilities to meet new 
challenges. Managing these complex systems over such long periods of time gives rise to 
difficult IP problems. We can distinguish two main sets of difficulties. 
First, when there are several units of such systems operating side-by-side (for instance a 
squadron of fighter aircraft), it is common that the individual systems will have slightly 
different configurations although they may be formally identified as the same model. In 
practice, different sub-classes of each model may be identified ex-post by “working 
backwards” through the different modifications to which the planes have been subjected. In 
this situation, it is difficult to identify and monitor the ownership of the IP that may be 
involved in each small change, as well as the components that, being part of the initial 
system, have been superseded by new ones. A line-by-line definition of the different IPR 
contained within a complex system may not be possible, and therefore it may remain 
preferable to stipulate IPR conditions in generic terms. 15  
Second, ownership over product data can generate problems with long term system 
maintenance and repair needs. Contractual conditions try to address this situation. For 
instance, the application of DEFCON 15 will require from a contractor the supply of a 
“manufacturing data pack” to which the MOD will have rights of use for the purpose of 
competitive procurement. DEFCON 15 is only to be applied when the development of a 
system has been fully funded by the MOD. Yet, today’s highly complex defense systems are 
likely to include subsystems or parts, or involve processes, whose development has been 
privately funded. The leading prime contractors we interviewed pointed out that it is very 
likely that some of the IP that the client requests to be included as part of the manufacturing 
data pack will be the result of private investment, that is not funded by the MOD. They are 
therefore anxious not “to give away” data that could be and is likely to be commercially 
sensitive, particularly if the support and maintenance of the system is not to be undertaken by 
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the prime contractor, but by a third party. Furthermore, there is a cost to the provision of a 
data manufacturing pack that the DEFCON does not appear to contemplate. As product 
components and subsystems are constantly updated, keeping a manufacturing data pack 
updated entails refreshing the data over the life cycle of the system to take account of the 
changes introduced by the prime contractor and its supply chain. This cost, coupled with the 
IP problem addressed above, does not appear to be thoroughly recognized by the MOD, 
according to the interviewed companies. 
The preceding examples show some emerging tensions in the application of IP conditions by 
the UK MOD. The root of the problem here is that it is almost impossible to foresee and track 
all the contributions, changes, and new requirements that will take place during a complex 
system’s long life. Nonetheless, there was a consensus among our interviewees, shared by the 
responsible officials at the DPA, that it is necessary to codify procedures for the protection of 
IP when dealing with the procurement of complex, long-life cycle systems. In fact some 
DEFCONS, such as DEFCON 15 referred to above, have been developed in collaboration 
with industry.  
Relevant to our article is the “687 family” of DEFCONs and DEFFORMs, which establish 
how a “shared data environment” should be operated. For instance, DEFFORM 687C 
provides a detailed “Electronic Information Sharing Agreement.” setting out the obligations, 
responsibilities of the SDE operator as well as user rights and obligations. DEFFORM 687c 
was finalized in 2001, after about 18 months of preparation in which both representatives 
from industry and from the MOD participated. In addition, the MOD developed a set of 
guidance notes to these DEFCONs and DEFFORMs at the request and with the collaboration 
of the Confederation of British Industry. These contractual tools can therefore be seen as the 
outcome of consensus-seeking process between industry and the MOD, who formally endorse 
their use. Yet despite their genesis and wide support basis “Type 45” (more below) is the 
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only full-fledged development and production program to implement some of the contractual 
tools in the “687 family.” 
UK defense prime contractors see the use of most IPR DEFCONS positively. Most of them 
have worked well and provided a proven and carefully constructed solution to the needed 
codification of IP protection procedures. But they also insist that DEFCONS must continue to 
abide by a principle of equity in which the MOD may not assume ownership of company IP 
without adequate terms of compensation.  
To sum up, the relationship between the UK defense customer and its suppliers when dealing 
with the development of a contractual system to deal with IP management issues is in a state 
of dynamic tension and one characterized by a mixture of collaboration and conflict. A 
continually evolving defense procurement policy, which, in turn, is driving changes in the 
content and application of contractual conditions, is perceptibly stirring up tensions within 
the main defense contractors. Still, there is broad agreement on the need to continue with the 
collaborative approach that has led to the development of some crucial IPR DEFCONs.  
Supporting network technologies and inter-organizational systems 
The technological foundations and the strategic rationale to deploy IT systems enabling the 
sharing of technical data information and collaborative working across geographically 
dispersed sites have been in place for some time. From the early 1990s communities of 
practice developed around concepts like TDI (Technical Data Interchange) and CALS 
(Continuous Acquisition Life-Cycle Support) among others. TDI focused on the development 
of common standards to exchange the electronic files used by different Computer-Aided 
Design and Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM).16 CALS was a more ambitious set 
of initiatives developing guiding principles and associated standard and technology 
developing activities aiming to create a new type of customer-supply network relationship 
that would use advanced Information and Communication Technologies to integrate the 
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different phases in the procurement of a complex system (design, production, support,...) into 
a continuous relationship. A key element in the implementation of the CALS vision was the 
creation of a “Contractor-Integrated Technical Information System”: a full technical data set 
that would accompany a complex system through its life-cycle, from conceptual design to 
system decommissioning, and would be delivered to the customer together with the system. 
In an SDE this data set would be available to partners during the system’s design and 
production. 
Initial applications of these principles proved problematic.17 During the 1990s, the civilian 
Boeing 777 became the best-publicized case of collaborative design and production across 
different locations for an aircraft system. Not only was this example heralded as an 
innovative program for its team management approaches, but was also lauded for 
representing the first use of digital computers to design and electronically pre-assemble an 
entire plane.18 Further, joint design was achieved through a distributed computer network, 
consisting of mainframes and workstation installations in Japan, Kansas, Philadelphia, and 
other locations. Yet for all its achievements this IT system fell short of constituting a full-
blown SDE in the way defined above. Instead of offering a centralized product database 
available online to project partners under various access control conditions, the 
communication between suppliers and Boeing was often carried out using more rudimentary 
techniques, which in the opinion of an interviewee was because 777 is “old technology” and 
the prime contractor did not see the need to introduce a more sophisticated IT system for data 
transmission. According to our interviewees, suppliers would e-mail their designs to the 
prime contractors sites and vice-versa, a process that was often slow and cumbersome given 
the size of the file attachments and the low speed of the modem links used. The slowness also 
caused project participants’ “design deadlines,” for instance, to be delayed because the IT 
network could not always cope with the volumes of data that was being transmitted. This 
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meant that file attachments were left sitting “on hold” until the system could clear the 
backlog of data transmission. 
In practice, the diffusion of SDEs using centralized databases accessible to project partners is 
still very limited. The US-led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the British “Type 45” Destroyer, 
described in more detail below, are the main examples of involvement by UK defense firms 
in programs in which an SDE is being used.  
In Type 45 the prime contractor (who is not the leading manufacturer but is the systems 
integrator) is responsible for setting up a centralized product database system to which all 
project collaborators can have access, and to organize and control different levels of access to 
each of the “folders” in the system. The system is based on Internet architecture, can be 
accessed through a Wide Area Network or dial-up connections, and uses a suite of off-the-
shelf software applications. In some cases the applications had to be modified in-house to 
adapt them to the specific needs of the program; this is the case, for instance, with Windchill, 
a set of software tools to enable a shared, Web-based configuration and document 
management system. 
The prime contractor for JSF is “Lockheed Martin Aeronautics” (LMA), which is both the 
final assembler and systems integrator, and also a sub-systems and parts manufacturer for the 
aircraft. LMA has implemented an SDE, which again rests on Internet standards and a 
combination of off-the-shelf software tools, including “Metaphase” (a Product Data 
Management program enabling access to an extended supply network) and, again, Windchill 
(providing a Web access to program management data). LMA controls access to these 
facilities. 
These examples show how Internet standards have been central to the implementation of 
SDEs in the defense sector. Yet there is a need to tailor the combination of off-the-shelf 
software technologies and Internet access to the specific needs of each complex project. As 
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we will see in the cases in the next section this still represents a difficult challenge for which 
no ready-made solution exists and that can be addressed using different implementation 
models (more below). 
Training 
The third response to the problems arising from the management of IP in collaborative 
projects is the need to inculcate in the engineering personnel a staunch sense of the 
importance of corporate IP. As noted above, all the firms interviewed expressed concern 
about the allegedly casual attitude of engineers towards the protection of company IP. The 
ease by which data can be transferred by electronic makes this concern more pressing, 
especially as the Internet is conventionally regarded as one giant copying machine. To 
combat this laissez-faire attitude toward the appropriate treatment of corporate IP, some 
companies have issued guidelines about sharing data across companies, warning employees 
about inappropriate sharing of data. Penalties for misappropriation of data can include 
dismissal, fines and even imprisonment. Others have introduced induction briefings on the 
management of IP and export control regulations, especially for those who are involved in 
international collaborative projects. However, these training sessions are conducted on a 
project-by-project basis, rather than as part of a corporate IP management policy. 
Interviewees unanimously agreed in the need for systematic training of engineers on the 
importance of corporate IP and the handling of these assets, as part of a company-wide IP 
policy.19  
Two implementation models 
As already discussed above, we found few defense programs with British participation in 
which an SDE system has been put in place. Here we show that the two main cases responded 
with dissimilar implementation models. They are different in the way the two major 
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constituents of an SDE solution as discussed in the previous section (the contractual 
framework and inter-organizational systems) are defined and combined. We can distinguish 
them accordingly: 
1. A “regulated approach” as applied in UK contracts using elements of the 687 series of 
DEFCONs and DEFFORMs. These contractual conditions were defined by a group of 
experts from defense suppliers and the DPA and relate to the way in which the SDE will 
work.  
2. A “prime-led” approach as applied in the US-led JSF transatlantic collaborative program. 
Here the prime contractor controls the definition of the inter-organizational system and 
imposes it, together with its associated IP conditions, to its international supply chain. 
Regulated approach: Type 45 and contractual conditions 
The Type 45 Anti-Warfare Destroyer is a large 7350-ton ship designed to provide fleet 
defense. Six platforms have already been contracted out of a total planned requirement of 
eight. This is the first full-fledged development and production program to implement an 
SDE following the approach laid out by the “687 family” of defense contractual conditions 
(DEFCONs) and forms (DEFFORMs). Type 45 draws upon DEFFORM 687a, which places 
obligations on the prime contractor to create, and manage a database of project information 
and make it accessible to users, and DEFFORM 687b, which establishes a “database 
information agreement” that sets out mutual obligations for all parties accessing it. These 
forms include IP clauses establishing, inter alia, that uploading data into the database does 
not imply the granting and unauthorized use of any IPR, and an obligation on the contractor 
to grant a user license to the customer (MOD) to operate and maintain the database system 
once this is transferred from the contractor.  
 19 
Although the responsibility for creating and managing the SDE can be vested in a third party, 
in this case it is the prime contractor, BAE SYSTEMS Electronics Limited, who is in charge 
of setting up the SDE. This is one of the responsibilities of the “Prime Contract Office” 
(PCO), but it has involved other partners and stakeholders in the development of the system: 
• through the application of DEFFORMs that are themselves the result of a process of 
negotiation among many industry stakeholders and Government.  
• the PCO has drawn on the input from main stakeholders, which include five main 
supplier firms and the program client, the Defence Procurement Agency. These six 
organizations, which have access to the SDE through a dedicated Wide Area Network, 
were involved in defining the SDE, its applications and management, and the user 
practices. This process is conducted through an “Enterprise Integration User Group,” 
which comprises representatives of all the main stakeholders, who is responsible for 
overseeing the system implementation across stakeholders, and reviewing and updating 
the enterprise integration strategy. The resulting “Enterprise Integration Implementation 
Plan” affirms that IPR previously owned by a stakeholder will not “normally” be 
published in the SDE, and that, if it is, such “background IPR” will be protected by 
access controls and made accessible only to the required stakeholders 
The Type 45 SDE is however limited in the extent of the applications and data exchanges it 
supports. The system carries extensive information on project management tasks, and 
provides a tool for sharing project information across several participating firms and the 
client representatives. Yet the use of the system is limited to information that does not have a 
classification of “Confidential” or higher national security restriction, a classification of 
which is not unusual in defense projects. Technical data published in the SDE includes 
graphical representations of the “product geometry” and results in a “product model” that can 
be used to guide the evolving design within the collaborating firms. However, detailed design 
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data, as for instance the CAD files used for the design of the different elements are not shared 
through the SDE.  
Despite these limitations the Type 45 SDE presents a new stage in the extent to which 
collaborative tools based on IT have been implemented to facilitate the collaboration across 
organizations involved in the development, production and operation of a complex product 
and the management of stakeholders’ IP. The system has now been in place for almost five 
years, has become a key tool in the management of the program, and is delivering the 
services to the PCO and its client.  
It must be noted that the complexity inherent in setting SDEs is magnified when it involves 
international partners. For instance, participants in the Type 45 SDE pointed out that one of 
the reasons why the system operates with relative simplicity is that is a domestic project and 
that no foreign suppliers may access the system. The main reasons for the added complexity 
when dealing with international programs are the need to deal with complex export control 
legislation and to accommodate different national regulations on issues like IPR and privacy. 
The JSF case discussed below provides an example of the challenges faced when 
international collaboration is organized around an SDE. 
Prime-led approach: the case of JSF 
As discussed above, LMA, prime contractor for the JSF system has set up an SDE using a 
number of available digital networking technologies. For the suppliers this is a mandated 
system, imposed as a condition for collaboration and in which the prime contractor, who 
manages and controls the SDE, defines and establishes architecture and procedures.  
The SDE revolves around a Joint Data Library (JDL) that serves as the node for the sharing 
of technical data across project participants. Ownership of data in the JDL is indicated by 
restrictive agreed legends, which are included in the footer of all data and drawings. Access 
to the JDL is established through formal agreements, so-called Technical Assistance 
 21 
Agreements (TAAs) between LMA and its suppliers. TAAs provide the formal approval 
mechanism enabling stakeholders to post and access data in the SDE and specify the kind of 
data that can be accessed and used by the supplier. TAAs have become a very complex tool 
to operate, particularly when they involve foreign (non-US) suppliers. Often several TAAs 
are signed with each supplier covering different sets of data for which the supplier acquires 
rights to upload and download. In particular, when the suppliers are foreign nationals such 
TAAs have to take into account existing US export control regulations and establish the 
relevant data access control accordingly. One the one hand this has a positive effect: as access 
to the JDL requires a TAA and, therefore, takes into account export control regulations. Data 
accessible by a partner through the JDL is, in practice, approved for transfer abroad in 
accordance with existing US export control regulations. On the other hand the system has 
become cumbersome to operate. For instance, a British firm participating in the program has 
signed over 160 TAAs covering, among other things, different requirements relating to the 
export and re-export of the technical data in different components and sub-systems.  
Furthermore, any data communication between two suppliers has to be approved by the prime 
contractor, regardless of the TAAs signed between the two suppliers and the prime. 
Accordingly the JDL is partitioned: suppliers cannot access the project data of other 
suppliers, only LMA as prime contractor has access to all data and information in the JDL 
Further, when a supplier is involved in different subsystems it will access different and 
separated folders under different TAAs. This means that different parts of a corporation 
working on other sections or aircraft sub-systems will not have access to each other’s data 
sets within the JDL. Again this has positive and negative effects. On the one hand, each 
supplier has its own set of folders containing its own information, which acts as a means of IP 
protection, avoiding potential confusion as to what information belongs to whom. On the 
other hand, the system slows down collaboration across suppliers. If a company needs data 
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from another supplier, it will have to request it from the prime contractor, who will then 
“post” the information in a common folder available to both companies, after checking that 
the requested information is available and indicated on the TAAs signed by both companies.  
Last but not least, the management of the access control at individual level is even more 
cumbersome. Any supplier employee wishing to access JDL data will have to request 
permission from the prime contractor, who then manually checks whether the individual is 
covered by a TAA and what are the rights that this TAA establishes. Once this information is 
ascertained the prime contractor provides access to the relevant project folder or folders. Yet 
the onus is on the individual to ensure that the information or access rights it needs are listed 
on the relevant TAA. Participating companies have had to train the employees working on 
this system on the complex operating procedures by which it is regulated.  
Summary 
The need-to-know data access controls, the TAAs and the physical checking by the prime 
contractor for releasing information and data to each project participant, and the segmented 
folder structure in the JSF SDE represent the collective means to manage the IP of 
participating collaborators. Unwieldy as they may appear to be, it becomes apparent that in 
international collaborative projects, the issues of export controls and IP are co-mingled and 
that an SDE to support such collaboration will need to consider these dimensions, bearing in 
mind that export-controlled items also contain an array of IP and IPR. These considerations 
return us to the observation that an international collaborative SDE will be complex, but one 
whose difficulties may not be insurmountable. In this, however, apart from the construction 
of a robust IT system, the procurement authorities may jointly need to “harmonize” their 
treatment of IP used in and resulting from the collaborative project. Alternatively, industry 
can also try to establish guidelines for the management of future joint projects.20  
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In comparison, an SDE participated by domestic collaborators is less complicated, although 
as has been noted in the Type 45 case, an assortment of controls and procedures to manage 
the participants’ IP has been instituted. However, given its relatively “smaller” size and 
national character, it is questionable whether this type of SDE would be “scalable” for larger 
international projects.  
Managing IP in collaborative SDEs: some lessons  
This article has attempted to extend the current literature on corporate management of IP by 
exploring the issues that arise from inter-firm collaborative projects using SDEs. As noted 
earlier, the literature on this topic has primarily focused on how firms manage their IP within 
the firm. As well, there is a paucity of studies on how firms use IT to manage their IP. 
Nonetheless, it is evident from our research that, in the context of changing procurement 
practices, IP and commercial managers view with concern the way IP is going to be managed 
within new inter-organizational collaborative frameworks.  
The two cases we have briefly discussed present two contrasting examples of the ways in 
which SDEs can be implemented in collaborative projects and IP managed within them.  
• JSF represents a more complex program as it involves a large supplier network 
distributed across several countries. British suppliers participation in JSF’s type of SDE is 
more of a contractual imposition from their client than as a tool to help them in their 
tasks. They have had no participation in the definition of the system, taking as a given the 
conditions for participation. The SDE provides an avenue for communication with the 
prime contractor (LMA), but communication with other suppliers through the SDE has to 
be explicitly allowed by the prime. 
• In comparison Type 45 has a much smaller number of partners (only six directly linked to 
the Wide Area Network) all of them located in Britain. In comparison with the JSF’s 
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hierarchical structure, the Type 45 SDE has developed a more collaborative environment, 
although responsibility for the SDE design and management remains with the prime 
contractor.  
The restricted nature of the JSF SDE reduces the chances for leakage of IP through the 
electronic network and simplifies the IP management process. In the Type 45 SDE the threat 
of leakage is minimized given the nature of the data being exchanged. The system is intended 
to share only information generated by the project (foreground information). As background 
IP is kept outside of the scope of this kind of SDE, concerns about IP leakage and misuse are 
reduced.  
Indeed, limiting the scope of this type of SDE and its functionality had lowered the risks and 
associated concerns. During our interviews it became apparent that, as far as IP management 
was concerned, the combination of contractual and technical solutions offered by this SDE 
was considered satisfactory. This is logical: had there been strong concerns about the 
management of IP within the digital environments being created, the system would not have 
been implemented. Yet, the construction of this SDE was based on a system that allowed the 
exchange of a limited set of data types or where accessibility to the data stored in the central 
repositories was severely restricted.  
How can the scope of an SDE be extended so that the potential offered by IT to organize and 
co-ordinate complex design and engineering tasks across organizations be fully exploited, at 
the same minimizing IP misappropriation and leakage? The problems that our study has 
unveiled suggest actions that can expand the scope and functionality of future SDEs.  
As we have seen, an approach to prevent unauthorized data access is to segment the data in 
the central database into different folders. Each participating organization will have access 
only to its own set of folders. This, as we have seen, can slow down collaboration among 
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suppliers. If a company needs data from another supplier, it will have to request it from the 
prime contractor, who after following an established set of procedures will “post” the 
information in a folder accessible to both suppliers. These approaches, managing information 
at the system level, are operationally convoluted.  
The alternative is to administer the system by tagging each data element with information 
including its origin, security, commercial confidentiality markings, and access restrictions, 
and then linking the access rights of individuals to the markings. This requires a parallel 
identity and access management system, in which all individuals must have proof of identity 
to log on to the system. Access will depend on the individual’s organization, role within the 
organization and any other factors, like nationality, with a bearing on the definition of his or 
hers access privileges. 
Such “data level” management system would allocate access rights automatically thus 
eliminating the need for a manual management of access privileges. The technologies and 
procedures to set up such a system exist. For instance, proposals have been put forward 
establishing detailed procedures to tackle security concerns and export control regulations in 
transatlantic arms collaboration programs. Further, experts interviewed for this project 
believe that the technological capabilities to set up sophisticated SDEs based on “data level” 
access management have existed for some time.  
Yet, as we have seen present implementations have established for themselves modest 
objectives and operate at levels of functionality lower than that allowed by existing 
technologies. The main challenge for the establishment of an SDE is of a managerial nature, a 
point that has also been highlighted in a discussion on information security.21 Management of 
IP within SDEs depends primarily on three aspects: (1) commitment to an IP policy, which 
institutionalizes clear guidelines and codes of practices on the treatment of corporate IP, 
including training of research personnel; (2) the establishment of adequate processes for 
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marking and management of data and access control; and (3) recognition that a corporate 
policy entails integration of input from the IT, legal and commercial departments into its 
definition. These three dimensions generate up front costs and require a coordinated inter-
organizational approach to IP and data management – the decision to embark in such 
initiatives will lie on the corporate executive tiers above the IT, with legal, and commercial 
departments in charge of implementing the system. 
The first dimension flags out the point that management needs to deal the non-technical 
issues that can emerge when setting up SDEs. In particular, our study revealed that 
commercial and IP managers were particularly concerned about those aspects of IP 
management that are more difficult to control through contractual or technical measures. 
Disquiet was evident among all firms interviewed about the way in which engineers and 
designers were treating the information they were working on and the results of this work. 
There was a high perceived risk of leakage of technical drawings, designs, and other types of 
data as engineers involved in a collaboration were perceptibly willing to share them with 
colleagues from other companies. This risk is amplified by the capacity to copy and transmit 
data afforded by IT, but it is not necessarily linked to the way in which these facilities are 
integrated within an SDE. An SDE with a limited functional capability like that of the JSF 
discussed here offers little additional avenues for data leakage. The risks posed by project 
employees who are not aware of how to treat technical data may or who have no guidelines 
concerning the importance of specific information assets, however, could impede the 
implementation of more open systems and suggests the need for rigorous IP management 
policies and procedures to initiate these actions.22  
Furthermore, although technical approaches to deal with this problem exist, such as the 
incorporation of “data level” access management into each document’s access controls to 
prevent unauthorized access upon release of a document, there is a need for a corporate IP 
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management policy to address training and raise awareness of the importance of blithe 
sharing of data. A corporate policy needs also to consider company wide processes and 
procedures for the treatment of company IP that is not formally protected and not focus on 
the protection mechanisms themselves, for instance, to patent or to keep a particular IP a 
trade secret. 
Moreover, as different SDEs are created for different projects, there is a possibility that in the 
future, the same company will be involved in several SDEs using different systems, 
contractual conditions and IP sharing rules. Such complexity also calls for better training of 
research personnel in the treatment and management of IP, lest it result in incoherent IP 
management practices. Therefore, training on IP management in digital collaborative 
environments needs to rise above its current project-by-project approach. A corporate IP 
management policy should systematically address these issues and establish procedures and 
behavioral guidelines with respect to the treatment of IP and information.  
Regarding the second aspect, technical solutions require detailed definitions of the access 
rights of the different types of users, security procedures that the users have to abide by, and 
the rights and responsibilities of the IT systems managers, backed up by adequate network 
technologies able to deliver the functionality needed to implement such a system. 
Third, and importantly, a corporate IP management policy sits at the interface of IT strategy, 
commercial and contractual policies, and engineering and design practices. While it is 
necessary for commercial and legal personnel to “steer” the policy, it is the engineers and 
technical personnel who will, eventually, be responsible for their implementation. We have 
found the interaction between these two groups of people often tenuous. For instance, the 
Type 45 Enterprise Integration Plan establishes mechanisms to request the opinions of SDE 
users on the operation of the system. This is an example of a good management principle: 
such a policy provides an information channel between engineers using the SDE and those in 
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charge of its management. Yet, it follows established practice in that it falls short of bringing 
together engineering, IT personnel, commercial and legal communities in the definition of an 
IP policy approach. It must be noted that in ensuring that IP is properly protected and used, 
and data access effectively controlled in an SDE, contractual obligations, IP practices and IT 
architecture must be inextricably linked. This requires close collaboration between the 
commercial/legal and IT departments, and therefore needs to be led from the corporate 
executive level. Lapses in this collaboration would likely lead to an inadequate IP policy. 
In more general terms the establishment of inter-organizational networks needs to account for 
the legal and regulatory environment within which SDEs operate. Experts that had 
participated in the development and, now, operation of the Type 45 SDE believed that its 
implementation had been made easier because of the national character of the program. An 
international project would be much more difficult to manage and would probably result in 
more modest functionality (as in the case of the JSF project). The requirements imposed by 
export control regulations will affect the architecture of an international SDE. Such 
difficulties are, however, not unique to defense projects; many high technology programs will 
deal with controlled technologies and will be subject to the same constraints regardless of 
their military or civilian character. The influence of regulatory constraints on the nature and 
structure of SDEs is crucial although it is often overlooked in the literature on inter-
organizational networks.  
Our study has argued that the nature of the IP challenges posed by the implementation of 
SDEs requires the commitment and support at the corporate executive level. Yet, IT 
implementations are viewed by project directors as additional costs rather than investments 
for the future, 23 and it is often difficult to attribute specific monetary benefits to the 
introduction of these technologies. When in 1995 one of us carried out a study on the 
diffusion of CALS principles in the UK, an expert in a major defense firm stated that the 
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industry displayed “a file transfer rather than an open database mindset.”24 This situation 
appears to continue today. We cannot ascribe this situation to the impossibility of protecting 
IP management within such collaborative IT networks neither can we blame the technological 
difficulties in establishing open database architectures to underpin collaboration. The 
procedures and underlying technologies to establish the networks and protect IP exist. Their 
slow diffusion could be attributed to the detachment with which corporate executive deal 
with the details of IT systems to be used in specific projects. Yet to bring together the 
commercial, IP and IT functions within the company and across the different partners in a 
collaborative project, and to support the establishment of “shared data environments” an 
executive drive is needed.  
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